Mr. Chairman, members of the committee,

thank you for this special opportunity to discuss the war of liberation

to remove Saddam’s regime from Iraq. I will not dwell on the

merits of why he should be removed. Suffice it to say, we must preempt

threats such as those posed by Saddam Hussein. We face an

enemy that makes its principal strategy the targeting of civilians

and nonmilitary assets. We should not wait to be attacked by terrorists

and rogue states with weapons of mass destruction. We

have not only the right but the obligation to defend ourselves by preempting these threats.

I will now focus on the way to do it very expeditiously and with

minimum loss of life on both the coalition forces, the Iraqi military,

and the people themselves, and at the same time maintain a relatively small footprint in the region.

Access is an important issue, and we want to minimize the political

impact on our allies adjacent to Iraq that are supporting the

coalition forces. Our immediate objectives will be the following:

Help Iraqi people liberate Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein and

his regime; eliminate weapons of mass destruction and production

facilities; complete military operations as soon as possible; protect

economic infrastructure targets; identify and terminate terrorism

connections; and establish an interim government as soon as possible.

Our longer term objectives will be to bring a democratic government

to Iraq using our post World War II experiences with Germany,

Japan, and Italy, that will influence the region significantly.

Now, I would like to broadly discuss the combined campaign to

achieve these objectives, using what I will call blitz warfare to simplify the discussion.

Blitz warfare is an intensive, 24-hour, 7 days a week precision

aircentric campaign supported by fast-moving ground forces composed

of a mixture of heavy, light, airborne, amphibious, special,

covert operations working with opposition forces that all use effects-

based operations for their target set and correlate their timing

of forces for a devastating, violent impact.

This precision air campaign is characterized by many precision

weapons, upwards of 90 percent using our latest C2ISR command

and control intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance assets

such as Jstars, Global Hawk, Predator, human intelligence, signals

intelligence, et cetera, in a networkcentric configuration to achieve

less than 10 minutes for time-critical targeting.

Using the Global Strike Task Force, the naval strike forces composed

of over 1,000 land and sea-based aircraft, plus a wide array

of air and sea-launched cruise missiles, this will be the most massive

precision air campaign in history, achieving rapid dominance

in the first 72 hours of combat, focused on regime-changed targets.

These are defined as targets critical to Saddam’s control. For example,

his command and control and intelligence assets, his integrated

air defense, his weapons of mass destruction, palaces and locations

that harbor his leadership, plus those military units that resist or fight our coalition forces.

All the Iraqi military forces will be told through the opposition

forces in our information operations campaign that they have two

choices, either help us change regime leadership and build a democracy,

or be destroyed. In addition, commanders and men and

weapons of mass destruction forces will be told that they will be

tried as war criminals if they use their weapons against coalition forces or other nations.

In a multidirectional campaign, coalition forces will seize Basra,

Mosul, and most of the oil fields, neutralize selected corps of the

Iraqi Army, and destroy the integrated air defense zone, command

and control, weapons of mass destruction locations, and Iraqi air,

using our stealth, SAM suppression, and air superiority assets.

This will enable coalition forces to achieve 24/7 air dominance

quickly, which is critical to our success.

The expansion of our beachheads in the north, south, east, and

west regions, and the airheads, seized with alarming speed, will

allow the opposition forces to play a very significant and decisively

important role with our special covert operations and the Iraqi

army and air force, to determine their status, i.e., are they friend, foe, or just disarmed.

The political arm of the opposition will communicate intensively

with the Iraqi people, letting them know they are liberating them

from 22 years of oppression, and that they are now controlling

large amounts of territory. Humanitarian missions will be accomplished

simultaneously with leaflet drops, et cetera.

U.S. and other coalition forces are helping us to liberate and

change the regime, is the mantra. You, the Iraqi people, must help

us to do this quickly, and with minimum loss of life. This IO campaign

must be well-planned and executed, working closely with the

opposition forces. This means that the administration must move

very quickly now to solidify the opposition forces, to include the opposition

military forces, and set up a shadow government with aggressive

assistance and leadership from the United States.

In summary, the Iraqi forces we are facing are about 30 percent

equivalent since Desert Storm, with no modernization. Most of the

army does not want to fight for Saddam, and the people want a regime

change. Let us help them to make that change, and liberate

Iraq from this oppressor. President Bush has accurately said, inaction

is not an option, and I am in support of his position.

I await your questions, Mr. Chairman.

I think clearly, Senator, there are 2 million

Iraqis in the United States that have fled Iraq. They are a valuable

source of understanding the people and the communications back

there. The opposition forces are in daily and weekly contact with

the military and other people in Iraq today. That is certainly a

good starting point, and that is why I think we need to organize

this opposition to understand the problem.

The forces I am talking about are enabling forces. Now, you can

debate whether it is 50,000 or 250,000 or a million. We are talking

about an enabling force to help the Iraqi people take their country

back and understanding these people, who I think are probably one

of the most sophisticated, if not the most sophisticated in the Middle

East in education and understanding, and they had a middle

class, and still do, it will be a lot easier than people realize.

I used the model of Japan and Germany after World War II. I

was a boy there. We had in 1948, we had one division, one division

in all of Germany, or at least in the U.S. sector, and the others had

more. There was not a large predominance—once you got rid of the

Nazi leadership and Hitler, then the people wanted to take this

path. I think the people in Iraq will want to take a path. I think

their neighbors will not want them to take a path toward democracy,

and that will be one of our biggest challenges. Democracy

does not flourish in the Middle East, and we must be sensitive to that.

That is correct, who are allies and who are vital to this construct.

Senator, I think the important thing is, the

opposition group must be developed. The fundamental tenet that

we have got to operate from, and I will not personalize this, but

there are people out there that our Government can actively work

with. They will not meet the Boy Scout sniff test. They will not do

certain things, but they will be part of a group that will have credibility

within Iraq, and it has the right objectives and the right motives.

Nobody loves Saddam in Iraq. Every family, I have been told by

Iraqis, every family has been hurt by this man, either in the Iranian

war, the gulf war, or personal prosecution that he has made

against them, and so we need to capitalize on that, and there is a sweet spot.

I cannot give you that answer now, but I do know that thoughtful

people can resolve that issue, and once you have that and have

a credible one, then everything else starts to roll with it, and so

that is to me extremely important, and I would just agree with the

comments that General Hoar made on the allies.

Well, I think that the opposition groups

clearly want to keep, except maybe the Kurds, keep Iraq as Iraq.

I mean, the Shias in the south, they do not want——

And that will be one of the entry points,

that because it is in our interests to have the Iraq that we have

there today and not a fragmented society, and that is, I think, how

we entered this argument and get our support, and that is extremely important.

Again, the size of the military, it is more the influence of the

United States to keep that than a large occupation force. I do not

see that as the requirement. It is the influence and the staying

power of our influence there helping to shape that democracy. Sir,

I believe that in one sense the two principal leaders of the Kurds

have made a deal with Saddam Hussein already. Both of them

have gone on record recently as saying that they are fairly comfortable with the relationship.

I think that that could be done again, but Mort’s point is well

taken. There is no tradition of democracy in that area. Iraq is the

instrument of post colonialism cut up by the British, cutting across ethnic lines.

No. I agree completely with General Hoar.

I would agree with General Hoar. The opposition

must be developed outside the country, and it must be

credible, and then working covert operations back in, but only

when you put U.S. and coalition forces in harm’s way in that country

in such an enabling force size that you can enable them to survive,

because in the final analysis, the coalition forces will be the

ones that make this successful. It is not the opposition forces. The

opposition forces bring political to it, Iraqis retaking Iraq. You are helping them do that.

Number 2, they also bring a dialog with the Iraqi people in the

Iraqi Army, and that is where we need to focus, but I would agree

100 percent with General Hoar and Tony Cordesman that, do not

let anything try to do it, them start by themselves.

I do not think air alone can do that.

My feeling is, is that Iran will take care of

itself once Iraq goes. Iraq has violated the U.N. accords. It has violated

everything. It attempts to shoot down every day airplanes in

the northern fly zone and the southern fly zone. If they hit one of

them, that is an act of war, is it not? That does not seem to bother

him, because I think he flat says, they just do not have it. They

just do not have the guts to come after me, and every day, they

fire at our planes, and every day we put them in harm’s way. Now,

that is why I think Iraq should come before Iran.

What you said about Iran is exactly correct, although I think

once Iraq goes, that Iran will self-correct.

The only thing I would say to that, Afghanistan

is not developing weapons of mass destruction, and that is

why the priority must shift. We clearly must stay and work the Afghanistan

problem, Mort. I agree with you 100 percent.

I would agree with General Hoar, and the

key thing is where we launch them. It would stretch us, but it is

throughout the world, because this would be a major regional contingency, but it is within our capability.

I would say, and I will not give a number,

but it is a smaller force, and let me give you a few reasons why.

No. 1, we have added certain technology in our bomber force that

we did not have in the Jdam, where you can have a B–2 hit 16 targets

at once, a B–1 can hit 24 at once, a B–52 can hit 12 at once,

I think. It enables them to stay up over the target so the ground

forces through binoculars lays, designate, and they have got a

bomb on target in 10 minutes, all weather, and so that is a quantum jump.

The Global Hawk, the Predator, where you have 24/7, we had

two Jstars in Desert Storm. One, they were prototypes. They would

fly at night, and the contractors would rewrite the code in the daytime.

Today, I think we are at 14 Jstars, which can sanitize a box on any movement.

The other things I would say, Senator, are, he does not train his

divisions in a division-size exercise. Their readiness is so far down,

and I think we all agree he does not have an air force. Whatever

you say, if he takes off, he is going to die, because the AWACs will

pick him up in the take-off mode, and our airplanes will be on

them, so he is going to be under constant attack.

Now, we definitely need ground forces, and I say we need heavy,

we need light, we need air mobile, but that rolled up with the opposition,

the opposition talking—because the opposition forces know

the division commanders. They have got their phone numbers.

They know the corps commanders, and there is something there

that we need to do better on, and I will leave it at that, and I know we can.

Do we have it right now? I would agree with General Hoar, we

do not have it right now, but all that rolled up in was a very important

campaign which speed and the simultaneous—remember, we

had 38 days, or whatever it was. Many would still like to have

that. There is a powerful synergy between simultaneous land and

air, because when you put ground in, he has to mass his forces,

and if anything we have invested in, it was taking tanks out on the

Central Plains of Europe, and that has got to be his main force.

And again you play back to the IO campaign, to the Iraqi people.

We are not after you nor your military. That is an extremely powerful

tool that we need to work on.

I think it will have a lot more significance

if we take care of Iraq first. Saddam gives about $950 million this

year to the PLO. He has bonded himself with that issue, where before

he was not, but I also think, General Hoar, it has gotten to

such a point over there that it is obscuring a lot of the other things

Afghanistan and Iraq.

The only thing I would say about Europe, they had the same

problem in 1939, Senator.